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Hardin and Medvid: A Change in
Indiana's Entrapment Law
From 1970 until 1976, the critical issue in Indiana's law of entrapment
was probable cause to entrap. Under the pronouncements of Walker v.
State,' a properly raised entrapment defense imposed on the prosecution a
burden to show that the police had reasonable cause to suspect the defend-
ants illegal activities before the arrest. Fulfillment of this condition justified
carrying out the scheme against the accused and permitted the state's case to
proceed to the jury. Evidence obtained without probable cause was subject to
exclusion. 2
Cases succeeding Walker presented situations where, even though the
police had initiated narcotics sales without the requisite probable cause, ac-
quittals seemed inappropriate because of the defendants' willingness to deal.
Exceptions to the demands of Walker were created, preventing undesirable
results but lessening the previous theoritical certainty of the law.3 In Hardin
v. State,4 the Indiana Supreme Court undertook clearing away the confusion
found in intervening case law by removing the probable cause requirement.
Hardin concerned a commonplace drug arrest. A police informant, whose
reliability was not questioned by the court, had reported narcotics purchases
made from Hardin. At the instance of the police, the informant contacted
Hardin to obtain heroin. The transaction was concluded routinely, and Har-
din was arrested. While Hardin argued that probable cause to entrap was
lacking, 5 neither he nor the prosecution challenged the soundness of Walker.5
On the court's own motion, these ordinary facts became the setting for recon-
sideration of Indiana's whole law of entrapment.
The court's attention was divided between the procedural demands of
Walker and the substantive elements of the defense itself. Having seen that
the vicissitudes of undercover work did not always permit the police to ac-
quire proof of probable cause when only minutes separated contact with
suspect and consummation of a narcotics sale, the court reasoned that
Walker was unduly burdensome. Although the danger to individual liberty
1255 Ind. 65, 262 N.E.2d 641 (1970).
2Smith v. State, 258 Ind. 415, 281 N.E.2d 805 (1972). Walker itself did not outline the
procedure by which the trial judge was to test probable cause. Later, in Smith, the court stated
that the prosecution was required to show some evidence dated before "the scheme was set into
motion," id. at 419, 281 N.E.2d at 806, which aroused police suspicion. Otherwise, "the work
product of the scheme cannot be utilized, thereby condoning and encouraging that which was il-
legal in the first instance." Id.
3Thompson v. State, 259 Ind. 587, 290 N.E.2d 724 (1972); Thomas v. State, - Ind.
-,345 N.E.2d 835 (1976).
. Ind. - , 358 N.E.2d 134 (1976).
5Id. at 135.
6Id. at 137 (DeBruler, J., concurring).
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posed by too-zealous enforcement of drug laws is great, the court also saw the
peril to society presented by unchecked drug trade. The court's unstated
reassessment of these perpetually conflicting concerns demanded that the
cumbersome procedural device 7 be abolished in the state's interest.8 Walker
was removed from the law, root and branch.
Turning to questions of substance, the opinion then offered a brief
history of Indiana's entrapment law.9 The state has consistently followed the
position of the majorities in Sorrells v. United States, '0 Sherman v. United
States," and Russell v. United States. 12 The federal test, the model for most
states,1s seeks police initiation of criminal conduct; if this is found, a com-
plete defense is established unless the accused is shown to have been
predisposed to commit the act. 14 Before reaffirming Indiana's adherence to
Sorrells and its successors, the supreme court noted judicial and academic
support 6 for closer scrutiny of possibly abusive police practices proposed by
the minorities of the three federal cases.16 However meritorious the sugges-
7 Walker's clumsiness was illustrated by the difficulty the court found in affirming the con-
victions in Thompson v. State, 259 Ind. 587, 290 N.E.2d 724 (1972), and Thomas v. State,
Ind. -, 345 N.E.2d 835 (1976).
i358 N.E.2d at 135.
9Id.
10287 U.S. 435 (1932).
1356 U.S. 369 (1958).
12411 U.S. 423 (1974).
13See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. Rav. 163 (1976) (collecting
authorities). Park notes that the Sorrells majority is followed in all but a handful of jurisdictions.
14Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
1358 N.E.2d at 136.
"Mr. Justice Roberts, concurring in Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458-59, and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring in Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382-85, contended that the issue that should
concern the courts in entrapment cases was not, as the majorities had held, the defendants'
predilections, but the quality of police conduct. Justice Roberts rejected outright the Chief
Justice's argument that the entrapment defense could be drawn from the statute as a matter of
fair construction intended to prevent "injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence." 287 U.S.
at 447, citing U.S. v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 482, 486 (1868). As Roberts saw the matter, en-
trapment could not quality as a true defense since it does not exculpate the accused; the defend-
ant still must be seen as having done the acts proscribed by the legislature. Because criminal
law infers mens rea from the acts, the conduct of the police lends no equities to the defendant's
cause. A great danger inherent in the majority's focus on the defendant's predisposition is that
the accused might be convicted because of a showing of past crimes. The sole basis for the
defense, Roberts said, is the "right of the court not to be made an instrument of wrong." Id. at
456. Proof of entrapment compels the court to protect itself from participation in reprehensible
conduct.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Sherman, although not so strongly worded as the earlier
concurrence, was critical of the majority's failure to furnish a theoretical foundation for the
defense. His examination of the district courts' handling of entrapment showed that revulsion to
individual abuses, not the Sorrells test, controlled their decisions. As Frankfurter framed the
issue, police conduct which falls beneath "standards, to which common feelings respond, for the
proper use of governmental power," 356 U.S. at 382, should cause an indictment to fall.
The fundamental-fairness, due-process tone of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion was
acknowledged by the majority in Russell when it was said that some actions might be so
outrageous that any criminal proceedings might be barred. The test, however, would certainly be
severe. Mr. Justice Rehnquist's citation was Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the in-
famous stomach-pump case. 411 U.S. at 431-32.
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dons were, they could not be considered by the Indiana court, for the
legislature had foreclosed debate by its incorporation of the Sorrells doctrine
into the state's new penal code.1 7 As the court saw the code provision, inquiry
into circumstances surrounding entrapment procedures had been reduced,
and the courts' attention had been directed toward the culpability of each
defendant. Hardin, then, appeared to have facilitated drug convictions by
limiting examination of police practices.
Although the case has already become the object of criticism " for por-
moting the cause of the state over those of individuals, the conclusion that
Hardin will work to the disadvantage of defendants may be unfounded. It is
arguable that Hardin has removed a procedural shield which gave only il-
lusory protection to the accused. Furthermore, a narrow evidentiary advan-
tage for defendants may have been generated a change in the law which
would operate far more fairly than the rules under Walker. The inadvertent
benefits conferred by the supreme court were domonstrated in Medvid v.
State1"' only a month after Hardin was handed down.
At Medvid's trial, the prosecution called the arresting officer to the stand
to show both probable cause and predisposition. In addition to his own ac-
count of the sale, the policeman repeated his informant's narration of
previous narcotics transactions that involved Medvid. The informant himself
did not testify. No other evidence of predisposition was introduced. A jury
found Medvid guilty.
In the court of appeals, Hardin provided the unexpected grounds for
reversal. In overturning Walker, the Hardin court had focussed on the ef-
ficacy of police tactics without considering the law of evidence spawned by
the probable cause inquiry. 20 While the policeman's testimony would certainly
have been competent to show probable cause to entrap,2 1 even absent
demonstration of the initial informer's reliability,22 hearsay was held incompe-
tent to prove Medvid's criminal predisposition. 23
17IND. CODE § 35-41-3-9 (Supp. 1977). The provision reads as follows:
Entrapment
Sec. 9 (a) It is a defense that:
(1) the prohibited conduct of the person was the product of a law enforcement officer,
or his agent, using persuasion or other means likely to cause the person to engage in
the conduct; and
(2) the person was not predisposed to commit the offense.
(b) Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit the offense does not
constitute entrapment.
1810 IND. L. REv. 747 (1977). That writer argued that Hardin was the culmination of a
series of cases which purged elements of the Roberts-Frankfurter test from Indiana entrapment
law.
1. Ind. App. - , 359 N.E.2d 274 (1977).
21358 N.E.2d at 136.
2 1Walker v. State, 255 Ind. 65, 71-72, 262 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1970).
22Kelley v. State, - Ind. App. - , 315 N.E.2d 382 (1974), McCarty v. State
Ind. App. - , 338 N.E.2d 738 (1975).
2The court's footnote, 359 N.E.2d at 276, pointed to Sumpter v. State, 261 Ind. 471, 306
N.E.2d 95 (1974), a curious prostitution case in which the defendant's gender was not adequately
1978]
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The logic of Medvid is compelling. Walker and its successors had provid-
ed the sole Indiana authority for the admissibility of hearsay to prove any
issue material to entrapment. With Walker no longer part of the law, it
followed that the hearsay exception which was created to allow proof of prob-
able cause to entrap should likewise be a nullity. Thus, Medvid carried Har-
din's abolition of Walker to its natural conclusion and contributed a much-
needed evidentiary rule to Indiana's law of entrapment.
To appreciate the attractive simplicity of Medvid's reasoning, it is
necessary to re-examine Walker and its successors. The preceding paragrapl$
describe an ungainly snarl of rules finally untangled by the combination of
Hardin and Medvid. Closer study of entrapment law during the intervening
six years finds gross unfairness and confusion prevailing. While Walker was
law, defendants bore the burden of unfavorable evidentiary rules. The form
of Walker's test threatened the state with acquittals won, not by meritorious
pleas, but through adventitious circumstances. Analysis will show that these
difficulties, latent in Walker itself, grew to monstrous magnitude. Hardin
removes the procedural problem conclusively, while Medvid offered defend-
ants relief from the oppression caused by an overbroad hearsay exception.
On its face, Walker presented only an evidence problem to the supreme
court. Plentiful testimony at trial suggested that Walker was a narcotics
dealer, and therefore predisposed to sell to police agents, but that evidence
was, in part, hearsay.2 4 Defense counsel objected strenuously on that ground,
while the state countered that hearsay was admissible to show predisposition
whenever entrapment was raised.25 The trial judge agreed with the prosecu-
tion: "I think it . . . is an exception to the hearsay rule, when entrapment is
a defense." 62 On appeal, Walker urged the plainly correct position that in-
diana law contained no hearsay exception concerned with entrapment. To af-
firm the conviction, the Walker court found it necessary to justify admission
of the hearsay report.
Instead of adopting the state's trial argument, 27 the court referred to a
rarely cited federal case, Heath v. United States, 2 which had held that hear-
say was admissible to show "reasonable grounds to believe"29 in the defend-
ant's previous illegal activity. This evidence showed that the police did "not
proved. The supreme court wrote "[w]e only hold that evidence of reputation introduced as
substantive evidence of guilt is inadmissible." Id. at 482-83, 306 N.E.2d at 103.
24255 Ind. at 71-72, 262 N.E.2d at 645.
25Brief of Appellant at 19, Walker v. State, 255 Ind. 65, 262 N.E.2d 641 (1970) (citing
trial transcript).
26Brief of Appellant at 20, Walker v. State, 255 Ind. 65, 262 N.E.2d 641 (1970) (citing
trial transcript).
2t The brief for the State was concerned principally with questions of waiver and did not
contest Walker's argument.
28169 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1948). The court's probable cause language pretty dearly refers
to predisposition. This solecism may be the source of Walker's problems of definition. See text
accompanying notes 38-39 infra.
1Id. at 1010.
[Vol. 53:549
ENTRAPMENT LAW
initiate the intent and purpose of the violation,"8 0 that is, the defendant was
predisposed. The Heath court had acted only, if incorrectly,31 bn the law of
evidence while leaving the remainder of the conventional Sorrells1 theory in-
tact. Heath's rule, although questionable in its approval of remote evidence
and in its use of entrapment terms,33 at least added no procedural complica-
tions to the understanding of the law. Walker, however, seized upon Heath's
"reasonable grounds" language and managed to convert the misnomer into
probable cause to entrap. Since rudimentary law permits the use of hearsay
to prove other forms of probable cause, the same could be said for probable
cause to entrap.3 4 In a peculiar and roundabout manner, the Walker court
had installed a hearsay exception into Indiana's entrapment law.35
The vices of Walker were three. Acceptance of Heath's rule of evidence
produced two of the defects, while the third was caused by the form of the
novel element the court chose instead of an unadorned hearsay exception.
First was the use of hearsay at trial to show probable cause to entrap without
taking steps to prevent the jury's hearing the second-hand accounts.36 Com-
monly a policeman, an especially attractive witness for the prosecution, would
repeat a description of the defendant's criminality which had originated with
an informant, often a very undesirable source. Prejudice could color judg-
ment as a jury heard the informant's unfavorable opinion of the defendant.37
Second, although the Walker court wrote as if probable cause to entrap and
predisposition were conceptually distinct, the likeness of the facts they re-
quired for proof invited conflation. The opinion itself leaves its reader with
the impression that the two were one,38 so it is not surprising that a jury
could mistake a policeman's reasonable cause to suspect for the defendant's
criminal predilections. It soon became the practice of prosecutors to
3Old.
1See the criticism of Heath written by Aldrich, C. J., in Whiting v. U.S., 321 F.2d 72,
76-77 (1st Cir. 1963). Similar arguments against the use of hearsay were expressed by Jackson, J.,
in a dissent to Walker itself, 255 Ind. at 72, 262 N.E.2d at 646.
32287 U.S. 455 (1932).
31169 F.2d at 1010.
"The court's citation for this proposition was Kinnaird v. State, 251 Ind. 506, 242 N.E.2d
500 (1968), an inappropriate choice since the issue was the use of hearsay before a magistrate for
issuance of an arrest warrant, not use at trial.
31255 Ind. at 71, 262 N.E.2d at 645.
31A contrary rule was laid down for the first district in Locklayer v. State, - Ind. App.
- , 317 N.E.2d 868, 872 (1974).53 The process ignored the prevailing rules for use of character evidence. The usual founda-
tion would not be laid, nor would the defendant's reputation among the general community be
shown. See 1 WIGMORE, EVWDFNCF §§52 et seq. (3d ed. 1940). Walker, referring to the hearsay
admitted there as reputation evidence, was unconcerned with these deficiencies. 255 Ind. at 71,
262 N.E.2d at 645.
381t appears that the same evidence was used to support both the finding of predisposition
and that of probable cause. Compare 255 Ind. 65, 68-69, 262 N.E.2d 641, 644 with id. at 72,
262 N.E.2d at 645, where identical hearsay reports from Walker's acquaintances were used to
show his reputation as a marijuana dealer.
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substitute hearsay for direct proof of the substantive element,3 9 even though
Walker had explicitly circumscribed the acceptable uses of hearsay. 40 Third,
by insisting on police knowledge of the defendant before initiation of the
scheme, the court made it impossible in theory for the state to secure convic-
tions of drug dealers who had succumbed to state solicitation without having
been known previously to the authorities.4 1 The court had left a trap for the
prosecution, as well as the defense.
Formally, entrapment seemed to have acquired a new component, but
the contents of the addition were little different from the old law.4 2 Defend-
ants claiming entrapment after Walker were likely to conclude that what
had been created was not a procedural limitation of the police, but an
evidentiary advantage for the state. Testimony formerly competent only to
persuade a magistrate at a probable cause hearing, but inadmissible at trial,
had been made a subject for the jury's examination.
The examples of abuses springing from Walker were many. The simplest
had the police testifying from second-hand knowledge to the accused's ex-
perience in narcotics trade in addition to a first-hand account of the sale
which was charged at trial.' 3 More objectionable was the situation in Hauk v.
State,4" where both probable cause and predisposition were established solely
by the out-of-court declarations of the informant who had effected all of the
sales known to the police. In Kelley v. State, 46 a jury learned form the police
witness that anonymous telephone calls had led the investigation to the defend-
ant's home. Another resident, not the accused, was named in the informant's
story to the police. These facts evoke troubling reliability questions which
were elided by the court. When settled law should have prevented use of an
informer's declarations, standards for admissibility were relaxed. 4"
"This was the practice adopted by the prosecution in Medvid, which was tried while
Walker was still effectual.
40255 Ind. at 71, 262 N.E.2d at 645.
41Although the State was rescued from embarrassment in Thompson and Thomas, the
court struggled to reach these exceptions demanded by the letter of Walker.
The absurdity of this possibility, acquittal of the patently culpable defendant, was noted in
Whiting v. U.S., 321 F.2d 72, 76-77 (lst Cir. 1963), where it was seen that, in some cir-
cumstances, the need to show suspicion of the accused before initiation of the police scheme ig-
nores the undeniable origin of the intent to commit the criminal act in the mind of the accused
and not in the creative enticement of the police.
42For an authoritative exposition of Indiana's entrapment law in this period, see Gray v.
State, 249 Ind. 629, 231 N.E.2d 793 (1967).43Hineman v. State, 155 Ind. App. 293, 292 N.E.2d 618 (1973). The police witness told the
court that his superiors had reported rumors of extensive marijuana trade at Hineman's address.
".__ Ind. App. - , 312 N.E.2d 92 (1974).
.5 Ind. App. - , 315 N.E.2d 382 (1974).
"See Payne v. State, - Ind. App. - , 343 N.E.2d 325 (1976). The informer,
Kaeding, had told the police that the accused dealt in marijuana, and that he paid "frequent
visits to Michigan City." Id. at 332. Defense counsel objected that Kaeding's declarations did not
even satisfy the standard of reliability for probable cause as set out in Bowles v. State, 256 Ind.
27, 267 N.E.2d 56 (1971), which required a previous record of reliability and extrinsic cir-
[Vol. 53:549
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Even without the broad hearsay exception engendered by the probable
cause to entrap requirement, defendants pleading entrapment would still
have had reason to doubt the efficacy of Walker's protections. When the
threat to prosecution interests appeared in Thompson v. State'7 and Thomas
v. State48 the supreme court excused the state from the rigor of the Walker
rule by holding that, in some instances, foreknowledge of the accused was un-
necessary to justify entrapment. The court's actions in these cases suggested
that lack of probable cause to entrap would seldom bar conviction.
In Thompson,49 the original plot had been directed against a man named
Nau. When the police met Nau to make the contemplated mescaline pur-
chase, Nau had missed his supply and was unable to deliver. On the follow-
ing day, however, Nau phoned the informant to tell him that the chemical
had been procured. Nau led the police agent to Thompson, who also had no
mescaline, but who acquiesced to a sale of LSD. Citing United States v.
DeLoache, 0 the court held that Thompson had initiated the offense. The ra-
tionale offered by the court was that where the police are led by the original
suspect to a '"previously unsuspected third-party stranger"' who becomes the
object of the police scheme, and who commits the solicited acts, entrapment
is no defense.
Because the Thompson court excluded probable cause language from its
opinion, reconciliation with Walker is difficult. One interpretation of
Thompson might be that probable cause to entrap had already been
legitimately provided by the investigation of the first suspect.52 Another
reading might be that the reports from Nau which led the police to the ac-
cused supplied probable cause.53 Both renderings leave Walker essentially un-
disturbed. Or, the court may have meant that where a defendant had for-
tuitously fallen into an ongoing trap for criminals, probable cause was un-
necessary to justify entrapment. If this was the holding of the Thompson
court, the deference toward police practices mentioned in Walker5' had
cumstances tending to verify the informer's story. The Payne court offered an elaborate justifica-
tion for the admissibility of Kaeding's reports which seemed, ultimately, to be grounded in his
friendship with the investigating officers.
4259 Ind. 587, 290 N.E.2d 724 (1972).
4_ Ind. - , 345 N.E.2d 835 (1976).
4'259 Ind. 587, 290 N.E.2d 724 (1972).
50304 F. Sup. 183 (W.D. Mo. 1969).The facts in DeLoache resembled those found in
Thompson, but the federal court was not faced with a probable cause to entrap doctrine.
51259 Ind. at 590, 290 N.E.2d at 726.
52"Having properly commenced an investigation centering upon a prime suspect, the agent
may follow it to its logical conclusion as a means of apprehending the accused even though the
accused turns out to be a third-party stranger." Id. at 591, 290 N.E.2d at 726. The opinion went
no farther than to imply that the investigation of Nan was within Walker's dictates, and did not
digest evidence of probable cause against Nau.5 This solution, however, suggests a reliability problem. See note 46 supra.
54255 Ind. 65, 71, 262 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1970).
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become predominant, and the" stringency of the probable cause requirement
was questionable.
Thomas v. State5 indicated plainly the last interpretation of Thompson
was the court's meaning and that Walker would not prevent convictions in all
cases of state-initiated crime. In Thomas, the police pawn entered a barroom
and asked the defendant whether anyone present had narcotics to sell.
Thomas replied that he had drugs himself. The informant walked to an
apartment building where Thomas sold him a packet of heroin. The police
had no knowledge of Thomas before the deal was made. In upholding
Thomas' conviction, the court offered not even speculative reasons which
might have sustained the actions of the informant and the police under the
Walker rule. The basis for affirming the verdict was that the "informant had
merely provided an opportunity for the Appellant to carry out his natural
propensity to commit the crime."6
Later in the opinion, the court acknowledged that its framing of the facts
disregarded police solicitation, but stressed that the defendant's readiness to
make the heroin sale showed him to be deserving of conviction. Although the
court's candor was edifying, a more serious erosion of the probable cause re-
quirement had been revealed. Under Thomas, it appeared that even random
police solicitation of crime would be overlooked if the person encouraged
demonstrated inadequate resistance. Any limitations on police conduct in-
stalled by Walker had been virtually removed by Thomas. Volunteers like
Thompson and Thomas, while making unattractive candidates for acquittal,
were not clearly distinguishable from other defendants pleading en-
trapment,5 7 whose readiness to deal may have been just as great. The Walker
doctrine should have dictated the same procedural protections for both
groups.
After Thompson and Thomas, Walker's purported limitations on the
police were dead letters. The sole consequence of Walker retaining any vitali-
ty by the time of the Hardin decision was the hearsay exception. The ques-
tion which remained after Hardin was whether the exception had survived the
abolition of the element created to permit the admission of hearsay, probable
cause to entrap.68 If the exception has persisted, entrapment trials will be
conducted in approximately the same manner they were while Walker ruled,
and defendants will continue to have their guilt determined largely on the
basis of remote, second-hand testimony.
s1 __ Ind. - , 345 N.E.3d 835 (1976).
S11d. at 857.
"See Payne v. State, - Ind. App. -, 343 N.E.2d 325 (1976); Kramer v. State,
Ind. App. - , 317 N.E.2d 203 (1974); Fischer v. State, - Ind. App. , 312 N.E.2d
904 (1974).
58The language of the Walker court in creating the exception was that "[e]vidence as to ap-
pellant's reputation to commit the offense charged may be heard for the limited purpose of
determining whether or not the police officers had good cause to believe that he was trafficing
[sic] in narcotics." 255 Ind. 65, 71, 262 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1970).
[Vol. 53:549
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If, however, Medvid is followed and the purge of Walker completed, trial
practices and police tactics will be affected. After Medvid, it appears that
prosecutors who wish to show prior criminal conduct of the accused as proof
of predispostition will more often be compelled to place informers on the
stand. Objection to this witness-production rule is likely on two grounds. It
may be claimed that citizen informers may be exposed to vengeance in their
communities, and, consequently, that fear of reprisal will discourage reports
to the police. Second, informants who have criminal records do not make
ideal witnesses, since their misdeeds allow their credibility to be impeached by
defense counsel.
Neither argument is telling. The concern for private informers seems
overstated. In past cases where informers' hearsay statements were heavily
relied upon, the informers were frequently nameed at trial, so the the
likelihood of revenge would not be increased. The difficulty posed by unat-
tractive witnesses may be compensated for by resort to other modes of proof.
The discovery of a large supply of drugs in the defendant's possession, or the
defendant's recent record of similar criminal conduct could be used to
demonstrate predisposition without placing an unreasonable burden on the
state.
Medvid's stricter rule of evidence may necessitate some changes in police
practices. It would no longer be possible to send an unaccompanied and
unobserved informant to make a narcotics deal unless the agent could later
act as a reliable witness. More official participation in undercover work and
surveillance suggest themselves as solutions, although the police may protest
that the new procedure would be inconvenient and sometimes impracticable.
The chance that the Medvid approach will not be followed by the
supreme court deserves serious attention. In overruling Walker, the Hardin
cort retained the deference toward police practices expressed in the earlier
opinion. 9 If this attitude controls in the supreme court, Medvid may fall into
disuse because of its effects on the law enforcement and undercover opera-
tions. Another impediment to Medvid's easy acceptance is that Hardin ap-
peared to regard the admissibility of hearsay as an incident of the entrapment
defense, not as a creature of Walker.60 Thus, it would not be difficult for
another court, looking no farther than Hardin, to hold that Indiana law re-
tains a hearsay exception despite Walker's disappearance. Alert scholarship
and essential fairness recommend the contrary result, so that Medvid's rule
prevails in Indiana.
Medvid should not cause substantial changes in the verdicts of most en-
trapment cases. The defense is not favored by courts and juries, and their
suspicion of the defense will not permit wholesale acquittals of drug traf-
59ld.
The Hardin court stated that "the focus upon the subjective intent of a defendant
necessarily opens the gates to the introduction into evidence of often variable hearsay and
suspicious evidence." 358 N.E.2d at 136.
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fickers. A degree of prejudice is inherent in the plea, so that success is likely
only when the accused can appeal compelling to intuitions of fairness.
More importantly, Indiana's entrapment law has been significantly im-
proved by Medvid's interpretation of Hardin eliminates much of the harshness
caused by a lax hearsay exception. The witness-production rule imposed by
Medvid will mean that defendants may be convicted over entrapment pleas
only by evidence which has been directly tested for veracity by a jury. The
task of trial courts, made simpler by Hardin, is more closely attuned to
justice by Medvid.
MICHAEL HYATrE
